INTRODUCTION
A large enterprise typically supplies multiple products. Even a singleproduct firm operates in a number of distinct geographic markets. Such firms come into contact with each other in a number of markets. Corwin Edwards [5] raised the possibility that multimarket contact enhances firms' ability to sustain implicit collusion, suggesting that,``The multiplicity of their contact may blunt the edge of their competition.'' Several empirical studies following Edwards such as Mueller [15] have found a significant multimarket effect. 2 The present paper provides a theoretical foundation to the possibility of implicit collusion among firms in the case of multimarket contact.
It is well known that in an infinitely repeated game with discounting, players can achieve fully collusive allocations, or efficiency among them, as doi:10.1006Âjeth.2000.2708, available online at http:ÂÂwww.idealibrary.com on perfect equilibria when players can perfectly monitor their rivals' actions. Friedman [6] applied this efficiency theorem to the study of an oligopolistic single market in which a small number of rival firms have a long-term strategic relationship, and showed that these firms tend towards implicit collusion in a self-enforcing way.
We cannot extend this efficiency theorem to the imperfect monitoring case. If players cannot observe their opponent's supply choices, it is impossible for efficiency to be sustained by a public perfect equilibrium even though players can obtain some noisy information about their opponents' actions. In a quantity-setting oligopoly, market demand may randomly fluctuate due to unobservable exogenous factors and, therefore, the market-clearing price is regarded as a random variable which includes only noisy information about their opponent's choices. Stigler [19] suggested that in such cases it is impossible for firms to detect their opponents' secret price cuts and this causes the failure of implicit collusion. Green and Porter [9] modeled an infinitely repeated game with discounting and derived an inefficiency result on this line.
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Several other works showed that efficiency can be obtained in the limit as the discount factor approaches unity (see Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [7] , Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce [2] , and Kandori and Matsushima [10] ). In contrast with these works, the present paper investigates the case of a fixed and possibly low discount factor.
In this paper, we argue that when firms encounter each other in multiple markets and make their supply choices in each distinct market dependent not only on the history of the prices realized in that market but also on the histories of the prices realized in all other markets, it is much easier for these firms to achieve implicit collusion than when they encounter each other in only a single market. It is shown that efficiency can be obtained in the limit as the extent of market contact tends to infinity. Of particular importance, this limit theorem in the imperfect monitoring case holds under almost the same condition on the discount factor as in the perfect monitoring case. Hence, the present paper should be regarded as the first work to derive such an efficiency result in the imperfect monitoring case with a fixed and possibly low discount factor.
We consider the following two-person infinitely repeated game with discounting. The component game is defined by a combination of m identical prisoner-dilemma games each of which models a single distinct market. In every period, each firm simultaneously chooses an m-dimensional vector of supply, each component of which is either``small supply'' or``large supply''. The resulting price in each market is either``high'' or``low'', and is randomly determined according to an identical probability function which depends only on the current choices in that market. Neither firm can directly observe its opponent's choice, but can rather only imperfectly monitor it through the realization of the noisy market price. The probability that the``low'' price occurs is positive when both firms choose``small supply'', but this probability is larger when one firm chooses``large supply''.
The Nash equilibrium payoff vector in the one-shot game implies that both firms choose``large supply'' in every market, but is Pareto-dominated by the efficient payoff vector produced by both firms choosing``small supply'' in every market. When monitoring is perfect, the optimal public perfect equilibrium payoff vector is equivalent to the efficient payoff vector if and only if the discount factor is more than or equal to some threshold which is strictly less than unity and is independent of the extent of market contact m. However, in the imperfect monitoring case, the optimal public perfect equilibrium payoff vector is Pareto-dominated by the efficient payoff vector irrespective of the discount factor.
The main theorem of this paper is that in the perfect monitoring case, if the fixed discount factor is larger than this threshold, the optimal public perfect equilibrium payoff vector approaches the efficient payoff vector in each market as the extent of market contact m increases.
In the proof of the main theorem, we construct a strategy profile which can be regarded as a generalization of the trigger strategy profile of Friedman [6] and is also related to the idea of the review strategy profile of Radner [17] . According to this specified strategy profile, a firm has no incentive to deviate in all markets at one time. By observing the ratio between the total number of markets m and the number of markets in which the``low'' price occurred, and by using the Law of Large Numbers, the rival firm can almost certainly detect such an all-market deviation. A firm also has no incentive to deviate in a single market only. It might be difficult for the rival firm to detect such a single-market deviation in the imperfect monitoring case, but a firm nevertheless hesitates to deviate only in a single market for fear that the rival firm should retaliate in all markets. This point corresponds to the view that Edwards [5] raised and which is commonly held:``A prospect of advantage from vigorous competition in one market may be weighed against the danger of retaliatory forays by the competitor in other markets. '' The difficulty that makes this paper non-trivial might be found in the proof that a firm has no incentive to deviate in more than one but less than all markets. We will show in Lemma 3 that there exists an integer k + such that the gain from deviation when a firm chooses``large supply'' in some k markets and``small supply'' in the other m&k markets is concave with respect to k if k is less than k + , whereas it is convex with respect to k if k is more than k + . This guarantees, as is shown in Lemma 4, that if a firm has an incentive to deviate, it always has incentive to deviate either in a single market only or in all markets. Hence, all we have to do is to show that a firm has no incentive to deviate either in a single market only or in all markets.
In spite of the unquestionable importance of the multimarket contact effect, there are few previous works on its theoretical foundations. Exceptions are Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer [4] , and Bernheim and Whinston [3] . Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer investigated a twostage game of price-setting duopoly where one firm operates in another market as a monopolist and its production cost in the duopolistic market depends on the sum of its output in the two markets. They explained some effect of commitment in the monopolistic market which calms price competition in the duopolistic market.
Bernheim and Whinston [3] is much more related to this paper. They investigated an infinitely repeated game, and confined their attention to the perfect monitoring case. They explained the multimarket contact effect on enhancing implicit collusion, and referred to its relevancy to several empirical studies. However, it must be recognized that the multimarket effect in the perfect monitoring case is quite limited, because, as the authors have described as``an irrelevance result,'' when markets and firms are identical, multimarket contact never enhances firms' ability to enforce implicit collusion.
The present paper is restricted to the example of a prisoner-dilemma game. The assumption of stochastic independence among multiple markets plays an important role in the proof of the main theorem. Moreover, we assume that players monitor their rivals' choices only through public signals. There is a growing literature of repeated games in which players are assumed to imperfectly monitor their rivals' choices through privately observed signals. 4 It is quite important to clarify the multimarket effect in more general cases with imperfect public and private monitoring, but this is beyond the purpose of this paper.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2.1 defines a prisoner-dilemma game. Section 2.2 explains multimarket contact, and defines infinitely repeated games with discounting and with imperfect monitoring. Section 2.3 presents a basic result in the perfect monitoring case, which gives a necessary and sufficient condition on the discount factor under which efficiency can be sustained by a subgame perfect equilibrium. Section 3 explains the main theorem in the imperfect monitoring case, and Section 4 present its proof.
THE MODEL

Prisoner-Dilemma Games
We define a prisoner-dilemma game G#(N,
and
where K>0, L>0 and 1>K&L. We denote
In the main part of this paper, we will assume imperfect monitoring in the following sense. Each player i=1, 2 cannot observe its opponent's choice, but can observe a public signal | # 0#[B, G] which is randomly determined and dependent on the action profile chosen by the players. When an action profile a # A 1 _A 2 is chosen, each player i=1, 2 either observes public signal B and obtains payoff g(a i , B) with probability p(a), or observes public signal G and obtains payoff g(a i , G) with probability 1& p(a). We assume
We must note that u i (a) is an expected value, i.e.,
An application is a quantity-setting oligopoly where each firm i=1, 2 simultaneously chooses either a small amount of supply a i =c (``cooperation'') or a large amount of supply a i =d (``defection''). Public signal | is regarded as the market price, where |=B means the competitive, low price and |=G means the collusive, high price. Because the market demand fluctuates randomly due to exogenous factors, the market-clearing price is also randomly determined. Each firm cannot observe its opponent's supply choice. The realized market price gives only noisy information about it.
We must note that the action profile (d, d ) is the unique Nash equilibrium in G, and the associated expected payoff vector u(d, d )=(0, 0) is Paretoinferior to an efficient payoff vector u(c, c)=(1, 1).
Multimarket Contact and Repeated Games
We introduce multimarket contact in the following way. There exist two rival firms, i.e., firm 1 and firm 2, which produce commodities in m number of distinct quantity-setting duopolistic markets. Each market h=1, ..., m is modeled by the identical prisoner-dilemma game defined in subsection 2.1. In market h, firm i=1, 2 chooses an amount of supply a i, h # [c, d ], and then observes a public signal, or a market price in market h, | h # 0.
These firms produce in every market infinitely many times. This repeated situation is modeled by an infinitely repeated game with discounting denoted by G(m, $ ), where m is the number of markets, $ # (0, 1) is the discount factor, and the component game is defined by a combination of m identical prisoner-dilemma games. Let S i #A m i denote the set of actions for firm i, and let 8#0 m denote the set of signal profiles. In every period t=1, 2, ..., firm i chooses an action s i (t)#(a i, 1 (t), ..., a i, m (t)) # S i , and then observes a public signal profile ,(t)#(
] is the amount of supply which firm i chooses in market h in period t, and | h (t) # [B, G] is the price realized in market h in period t.
A pure public strategy, or simply a strategy, for firm i is defined by
is the null history, for every t 1,
and _ i, h (, t ) # A i is the amount of supply which firm i chooses in market h in period t+1 given history , t . A firm's choice of supply in a market may depend on not only the history relevant to this market but also the histories relevant to the other markets. (_, $ ) ). For every history , t , let _ i | , t denote the strategy for firm i after history , t occurs. Let _ | , t #(_ 1 | , t , _ 2 | , t ). A strategy profile _ is said to be a public perfect equilibrium in G(m, $) if for every t=1, 2, ..., every , t # 8 t , every i=1, 2, and every strategy _ i $ ,
where j{i.
Remark 1. The terminology of public strategy and public perfect equilibrium is introduced by Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [7] and Radner, Myerson and Maskin [18] . In general, a strategy for a player may depend not only on public histories of signal profiles but also on private histories of her own actions. However, Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin have shown that the public perfect equilibrium property is robust in the sense that there exists no strategy which depends on private histories and gives the higher payoff than this public equilibrium strategy. See Fudenberg and Tirole [8, Chapter 5].
Perfect Monitoring: Basic Result
Before starting the analysis of the imperfect monitoring case, it might be helpful to consider the perfect monitoring case. Assume that each firm can directly observe its opponent's choice at the end of every period. Define a strategy for firm i, which is so-called the trigger strategy, as follows:
Choose s i (1)=(c, ..., c) in period 1.
In every period t 2, choose s i (t)=(c, ..., c) if firm i observed ((c, ..., c), (c, ..., c)) # S 1 _S 2 in all previous periods.
The trigger strategy says that firm i chooses``cooperation in all markets'' as long as no firm deviates from``cooperation in all markets,'' but chooses``defection in all markets'' once a firm deviated from``cooperation in all markets''.
We must note that if both firms conform to the trigger strategy profile, they obtain the efficient normalized expected payoff (m, m). Proposition 1. The trigger strategy profile is a perfect equilibrium if and only if these firms are patient enough to satisfy the inequality
Proof. Whenever a firm deviates in a market, then the opponent will choose d in all markets forever from the next period according to the trigger strategy. Hence, choosing d in all markets in all periods is the best strategy among all deviating strategies. This deviating strategy gives the deviant the normalized expected payoff (1&$ ) m(l+K ). It is clear that this value is less than or equal to the normalized expected payoff induced by the trigger strategy profile m, if and only if inequality (1) holds.
Q.E.D.
Remark 2. We must note that the one-shot Nash equilibrium payoff vector (0, 0) is the minimax point, and therefore, the infinite repetition of the choice of (d, d ) in all markets is regarded as the severest equilibrium punishment. According to Abreu [1] , one gets that inequality (1) is not only sufficient but also necessary for the attainability of efficiency among these firms, even though all strategy profiles other than the trigger strategy profile are taken into account as possible equilibrium strategy profiles.
Remark 3. We must also note that the necessary and sufficient condition (1) does not depend on the number of markets m. This corresponds to the``irrelevance result'' of Bernheim and Whinston [3, Section 3] which states that, in the perfect monitoring case, multimarket contact has no influence on the possibility of implicit collusion when the model is symmetric.
IMPERFECT MONITORING: MAIN THEOREM
It is well known in game theory literature that if monitoring is imperfect and the discount factor is strictly less than unity, it is impossible to achieve efficiency as a perfect equilibrium payoff vector. 5 We show as the main theorem of this paper that, as the number of market contact m increases, the efficiency loss per market of public perfect equilibrium in the imperfect monitoring case approaches zero and that, as such, the efficient payoff vector per market (1, 1) can be approximately sustained by a public perfect equilibrium when m is large enough. Of particular importance, this approximate efficiency is shown to hold under almost the same condition on the discount factor as in the perfect monitoring case, i.e., it holds if inequality (1), which is the necessary and sufficient condition in the perfect monitoring case, holds with strict inequality. . If inequality (1) holds with strict inequality, i.e.,
then there exists an infinite sequence of strategy profiles (_ [m] ) m=1 which satisfies that for every i=1, 2,
and there exists m Ä such that for every m m Ä , _ [m] is a public perfect equilibrium in G(m, $ ).
The proof of this theorem depends on the assumption of stochastic independence among multiple markets. The result of the theorem may not hold when the public signals are correlated. We present an example in the following way.
Suppose that a player i chooses d in some k markets and chooses c in the other m&k markets, while her opponent j{i chooses c in every market. Then, the players observes signal G at once in every market with probability 1 2 , whereas, with probability 1 2 they observe signal G in every market in which player i chooses c but observe signal B in every market in which player i chooses d. Hence, whenever the players observes signal B in any single market then they also observe signal B at the same time in every market in which someone deviates. Efficiency can be only obtained if
This inequality is more restrictive than inequality (2), and is constant with respect to number of markets m. This implies that the multimarket effect may not work.
PROOF OF THE THEOREM
The proof of this theorem is constructive. 
for all {=1, ..., t , and
). According to _ [m] , each firm continues to choose``cooperation in all markets'' as long as the number of markets in which signal B is observed is less than the threshold r(m). Once this number is more than or equal to r(m), both firms immediately stop choosing``cooperation in all markets'' and continue to choose``defection in all markets'' from the next period. 
where
From the definition of f (r, m, k), Note
and f (r, m, k&1)= p(c, c) f (r&1, m&1, k&1)
The normalized expected payoff for firm i induced by _ [m] is written by
.
Choose an infinite sequence of thresholds (r(m)) m=1 which satisfies
. ( 9 ) Lemma 1. There exists an infinite sequence of thresholds (r(m)) m=1 which satisfies equalities (7) and (8) and inequality (9).
Proof. See Appendix A.
that is, equality (3) holds. Hence, for every large enough m, _ [m] approximately achieves the efficient payoff vector per market (1, 1). We show below that there exists m Ä such that for every m m Ä , _ [m] is a public perfect equilibrium in G(m, $ ).
If firm i deviates from _ 
We must note that
i.e., if for every
The following property of single-peakedness of f (r, m, k) with respect to k will simplify the proof for public perfect equilibrium of _ Proof. See Appendix B.
By using Lemma 2, we prove a further lemma, which plays an important role in the proof of this theorem. 
169 From equalities (10) and (11),
From Lemma 2 and inequality p(d, c)>p(c, c), value (14) is nonincreasing with respect to k # [1, ..., k*(r(m)&1, m&1)] whereas it is nondecreasing with respect to
Lemma 3 implies that there exists an integer k + such that the gain from deviation when a firm chooses d in k markets and c in the other m&k markets is concave with respect to k if k is less than k + , whereas it is convex with respect to k if k is more than k + . By using Lemma 3, we show that all we have to do is to prove that a firm has no incentive to deviate only in a single market and has no incentive to deviate in all markets. That is, 
This implies that if
Hence, if firm i does not prefer to deviate in a single market, firm i does not prefer to deviate in any number of markets less than or equal to k*(r(m)&1, m&1) also. 
This implies that either
and therefore, one gets that if
. From these observations, we have proven this lemma.
We show that a firm has no incentive to deviate only in a single market.
Lemma 5. There exists an integer m Ä such that for every m m Ä ,
Proof. From equalities (3) and (14) and inequality (9),
Hence, we have proven this lemma.
We show that a firm has no incentive to deviate in all markets.
Lemma 6. If inequality (2) holds, then there exists an integer m Ä such that for every m m Ä ,
Proof This, together with equalities (3) and (10), implies
which is less than 1 because of inequality (2) . From equality (3),
and therefore, we have proven this lemma. Q.E.D.
From Lemmata 4, 5, and 6, we have proven that there exists m Ä such that for every m m Ä , _
[m] is a public perfect equilibrium in G(m, $ ) under strict inequality (2) . Hence, we have completed the proof of this theorem. Proof. Suppose that there exists no such (r(m)) m=1 . Then, we can choose an infinite sequence of positive integers (m(x)) x=1 , such that lim x Ä m(x)= , and for every x, there is no r which satisfies both inequalities (A3) and (A4) for m=m(x). From equality (4),
and therefore,
For every x and every r satisfying inequality (A4) for m=m(x), inequality (A3) does not hold for m=m(x), and therefore, one gets from equality (A5) that
Hence, which is a contradiction of equality (A2).
It is clear from inequality (A3) that (r(m)) m=1 specified in Lemma A-1 satisfies inequality (9) .
We show below that (r(m)) m=1 satisfies equalities (7) and (8) f (r, m(x), 0) =1&1=0, which is a contradiction of equality (7) .
From these observations, we have proven Lemma 1.
If f (r+1, m&1, k&1)< f (r, m&1, k&1), then equalities (5) and (6) From these observations, we have proven that if f (r+1, m, k&1) f (r, m, k&1), then f (r+1, m, k) f (r, m, k). This implies that r*(m, k) is nondecreasing with respect to k. K By using Lemma B-1, we prove Lemma 2 in the following way. Fix (r, m, k) arbitrarily.
Suppose that 0 r r*(m&1, k&1). Lemma B-1 says r*(m&1, k) r*(m&1, k&1), and therefore, 0 r r*(m&1, k), i.e., f (r, m&1, k) f (r&1, m&1, k). 
Suppose that r*(m&1, k&1)<r m. Then, f(r, m&1, k&1) f (r&1, m&1, k&1).
Equalities (5) and (6) 
From inequalities (B4) and (B5), one gets that for every (r, m, k), either f(r, m, k) f (r, m, k+1) or f (r, m, k&1) f(r, m, k), which means the single-peakedness with respect to k.
From these observations, we have proven Lemma 2.
